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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CO-AX ENTERPRISES, ] 
a corporation, ] 
Plaintiff 
and Appellant, ; 
vs. 
THE TRIAX COMPANY, 
Defendant 
and Appellee. 
i Case No. 20033 
DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE THE TRIAX COMPANY REPLY 
TO PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
The Respondent, The Triax Company, submits the follow-
ing in reply to the Appellant's Petition for Rehearing. 
I. 
THE APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING FAILS TO COMPLY 
WITH RULE 35 OF THE RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court sets out 
the narrow basis upon which a Petition for Rehearing may be made. 
A Petition must "state with particularity the points of law or 
fact the which the Petitioner claims the Court has overlooked or 
misapprehended,ft The Petition for Rehearing filed in the instant 
case fails to set forth any law or facts which the Court has 
overlooked or misapprehended. The Petition for Rehearing is 
simply a rebriefing of the same issues, same legal arguments, and 
same matters set forth in the prior briefs before the Court, The 
Petition does not set out any fact or law which the Court 
overlooked or misapprehended. No argument is asserted in the 
Petition that the Court has overlooked or misapprehended either 
the facts or the law. 
The Petition for Rehearing quotes from the verdict of 
the lower court on pages 3 and 4. The same portion of the 
verdict was quoted by the Supreme Court in its decision, on pages 
3 and 4 of the slip opinion. The same quote also appeared in the 
prior original brief filed in this appeal by the Respondent on 
pages 6 and 7. Clearly, therefore, the Court did not overlook or 
misapprehend this matter. The Court was well informed, con-
sidered the matter, and reached a reasoned decision. Appellant 
is merely asking the Court to please change its mind. This, of 
course, does not comply with Rule 35. 
In the Petition for Rehearing the Appellant places 
great emphases upon two cases. These cases are Guerini Stone Co. 
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v, P. J. Carl in Constr. Co., 248 HcS. 334 (1919) and Walsh v. 
United States, 102 F.Supp. 589 (Ct. CI. 1952) both of these cases 
were cited and argued in the Appellant's prior brief. Guerini 
was cited on page 10 of Appellant's prior brief and Walsh was 
cited on page 11. Furthermore, the slip opinion of the Supreme 
Court cites both of these cases on page 5 of the decision. 
Again, there is no doubt that the Court did not overlook or 
misapprehend the cases. Appellant does not urge that they were 
overlooked or misapprehended. Appellant merely is reasserting 
the same matter already briefed, argued and considered by the 
Court. Rule 35 contemplates more than this. 
The Appellant also cites Bvrne v. Bellincrham Consol. 
School Dist. No. 301, 108 P.2d 791 (Wash. 1941) on page 3 of its 
Petition for Rehearing, which is the same case that was cited on 
page 13 of the Appellant's original brief and argued there. 
Llovd v. Murphy 153 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1944) appears on page 4 of the 
Petition for Rehearing and appeared previously on page 13 of the 
Appellant's prior brief. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d, 957 (5 CA 1976) appears on page 4 of the 
Petition for Rehearing and appeared previously on page 14 of the 
Appellant's prior brief. In short, every significant case cited, 
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and every quote from the lower court appeared in the prior briefs 
and arguments submitted to and considered by the Court. 
Rule 35 requires that the Petition point out matters 
that have been overlooked or misapprehended, and the Petition has 
failed to do so or to even suggest that the Court has failed to 
apprehend or consider what is now being argued again. Appellant 
is merely asking the Court to look at the same arguments, same 
facts, same cases and change its mind, and is a rather cynical 
expression of doubt in the finality of the Court's decision 
making. Appellant apparently believes that if you ask the same 
thing twice the Court may say "no" the first time and "yes" the 
second. Rule 35, of course, requires more than this. Accord-
ingly, the Petition for Rehearing should be summarily denied for 
failure to comply with Rule 35 of the Rules of Utah Supreme 
Court. 
II. 
THE JURY VERDICT WAS INTENDED BY THE LOWER COURT AND 
BOTH PARTIES TO DISPOSE OF THE ENTIRE CASE, AND THE VERDICT DID 
SO. 
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In the Petition for Rehearing the Appellant complains 
that the lower court reached a conclusion on a matter that was 
"something the jury had not been asked to decide." (page 3 of 
Petition for Rehearing) This assertion is incorrect. It was the 
intention of the lower court, and the intention of both parties, 
to submit the entire matter for decision by the jury. The Jury 
Verdict Special Interrogatories prepared by the lower court and 
submitted to the jury had the approval of both the Appellant and 
the Respondent. The purpose of the Jury Trial was to allow the 
jury to decide the case in its entirety. it was not expected by 
either party that there would be anything left for further 
resolution by the Court or by the parties after the jury had 
ruled. 
Interrogatory number 5 was approved by the Appellant. 
Interrogatory number 5fs purpose was to eleminate any liability 
on the part of the Respondent if the jury found that there had 
been no promise made. Significantly, Interrogatory number 5 is 
not limited to an "express" promise, although the Appellant 
argues that it should be construed as such after the fact. The 
Interrogatory asks whether or not there was a promise or guaran-
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tee, presumably either expressed or implied. In any event, the 
purpose of the Interrogatory was to dispose of the case. 
The trial court heard the evidence presented by both 
sides. The trial court was in a position to allow or disallow 
parole evidence in the court below. The lower court elected to 
permit parole evidence to be introduced. The admission was based 
upon parole evidence that the written contract between the 
parties was modified to include a time period for performance. 
Finding a time period for performance, however, does not con-
clusively establish that there was an undertaking or assumption 
of risk by the Respondent guaranteeing that the time period would 
be met. As the parole evidence was received the lower court 
heard testimony about the parties1 prior experience with con-
struction in "remote places". Both the Appellant and the 
Respondent were familiar with work in the remote* area of Midway 
Island. Both parties knew that there were not materials avail-
able at the site except those that were brought in by boat. Both 
knew that all workman had to be transported to the job site as 
well. Both knew that making guarantees or promises that ship-
ments would arrive timely could not be possible given the 
remoteness of the location. The lower court heard, understood, 
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and ruled in light of the evidence that it received at the time 
of the trial. (See Transcript at page 45 line 17 et seg. ; and 
pages 66 through 70) 
At the conclusion of the presentation at trial the 
lower court framed ten special Interrogatories for the jury. 
The Interrogatories were designed to allow the jury to find what 
the parties intended for the time of performance and who would be 
responsible if the limitations were not met. In doing this the 
lower court framed Interrogatory number 4 which asks whether the 
Appellant was hindered by the conduct of the Respondent in the 
delivery of the materials. The Interrogatory was intended to 
establish that the non-delivery of materials by the Respondent 
had caused the Appellant to be unable to complete the work with-
in the time limitation. The jury answered this Interrogatory 
"yes". 
The Court then posed Interrogatory number 5 which asked 
whether the Respondent promised or guaranteed that sufficient 
materials would be at the job site in order to permit the 
Appellant to perform the contract within the agreed five month 
limitation. To this the jury responded "no". At this point the 
lower court, the jury, the Appellant, and the Respondent realized 
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that the evidence received, both oral and documentary, had made 
it clear that the contract in question was to be performed in a 
"remote place" and that this fact had been recognized by both 
parties when contracting. This fact prevented Respondent from 
promising or guaranteeing that materials would be delivered in a 
specific time frame. Both parties were experienced in con-
struction work and both parties knew that such a guarantee or 
promise could not be reasonably made. This was the clear import 
of the lower court's decision, and the clear result of the jury's 
deliberation and decision. 
In the Petition for Rehearing the Appellant cites LLoyd 
v. Murphy, Supra, and Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., Supra, for the proposition that a "promisor" 
assumes a certain risk. The problem with the Appellant's 
assertion is that there is, in the present case, no promisor. No 
promise was made. Interrogatory number 5 and the jury's answer, 
make it clear that no promise was made, and the lower court 
further found that under the circumstances of this case, as it 
was tried below, no promise could be made. The Appellant seeks 
to impose by law a promise in derrogation of the agreement of the 
parties. 
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The Petition for Rehearing should be denied because the 
jury found facts which disposed of the case in its entirety. It 
is inappropriate for the Court now to reverse the decision of the 
lower court and the jury. If the Appellant wanted the jury to 
find something further, or to answer any further Interrogatories, 
the time for the Appellant to have made such a request was at 
trial. The Appellant did not make such a request in the court 
below, and should be estopped from reversing the jury after the 
fact when the jury reached a decision that was intended to 
dispose of the case. 
III. 
IN THE LOWER COURT BOTH PARTIES AND THE COURT TRIED THE 
CASE ON AND "EXPRESS AGREEMENT" BASIS, AND TO PERMIT THE APPEL-
LANT TO CHANGE ITS LEGAL THEORY TO AN "IMPLIED AGREEMENT" FOR THE 
FIRST TIME AFTER TRIAL DENIES THE RESPONDENT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The Respondent is entitled to receive notice of the 
claims that are asserted against it. Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure requires that notice be given in a Plaintiff's 
Complaint of the claim asserted. The Appellant's Complaint as 
well as the theory pursued at trial by the Appellant, focused 
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exclusively on the Appellant's assertion that an express agree-
ment had been reached guarantying delivery of materials within a 
specified time frame. This theory was unproven by the Appellant. 
This theory was disposed of by the jury in their reply to Inter-
rogatory number 5. Having failed to prove its case, the Appel-
lant now changes its theory for the first time after the trial 
and urges that the decision of the jury should be overridden and 
the Appellant should be given a windfall victory on a new legal 
theory which respondent was not allowed to answer at Trial. 
Fundamental fairness, due process of law, and notice 
pleading require that that theory be plead before it be tried or 
that it be tried before decided. Appellant has neither plead nor 
tried the theory it now wants decided. If the Supreme Court is 
persuaded that this legal theory has some potential validity, the 
appropriate course is not to reverse the lower court but to 
instead require a retrial with the new legal theory being 
presented to a jury. The legal theory of an implied promise is 
not irrefutable. An implied promise does not cfet imposed under 
the law upon every state of the facts, notwithstanding the 
agreements, representations, or conduct of the parties. It is 
possible to refute an implied promise. Respondent should be 
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given the opportunity to show there was no such promise because 
none could be made. 
Significantly, the lower court did not limit Inter-
rogatory number 5 to being either an "express" or "implied" 
promise or guarantee. The jury found that there was no promise 
or guarantee given by the Respondent. The only consistent way to 
harmonize this decision with the failure of the Appellant to 
assert in its pleadings an implied promise, is to decide that 
there was no promise either express or implied given under the 
state of the facts. If the court decides, however, that an 
implied promise theory is appropriate to be considered, the Court 
on appeal is not the appropriate tribunal to consider what effect 
that would have on the mind of the jury. Instead a retrial 
should be ordered and due process granted to the Respondent and 
an opportunity to meet this new theory at trial afforded. As 
things now stand the Appellant is urging on the court a legal 
theory that the Respondent has never had an opportunity to meet 
or refute at trial. 
The effect of the jury's answer to Interrogatory number 
5 is that no promise or guarantee, express or implied, was given 
to the Appellant by the Respondent. In light of the answer of 
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the jury to Interrogatory number 5, a finding that there was an 
obligation express, implied, or otherwise, effectively substi-
tutes the Supreme Court for the jury. (See eg, First Security 
Bank of Utah, Nat. A. v. Ezra C. Lundahl. Inc. 454 P.2d 886 (U. 
1969)) 
The Jury was intended by the parties to be the finder 
of fact. The jury found that in fact there was no promise or 
guarantee given. Based upon this, the lower court entered an 
appropriate judgment in favor of the Respondent. It is not 
appropriate to reverse the jury's decision on Interrogatory 
number 5 and find that there is a promise or guarantee, when the 
jury concluded that there was none. (See Cottrell v. Grand Union 
Tea Company. 299 P.2d 622, 626, (U. 1956.)) 
CONCLUSION 
The Petition for Rehearing fails to comply with the 
requirements of Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
There is nothing new presented in argument or in fact. The 
Appellant is simply reiterating what had previously been submit-
ted, considered, and rejected by the lower court and the Utah 
Supreme Court in prior decisions. 
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The jury was asked to decide this case in its entirety. 
The jury did so. The jury's decision on Interrogatory number 5 
negates any promise or guarantee, express or implied, and nothing 
further should be added to or taken away from the jury's decision 
in order to reach a contrary result* 
If the Court were to find that there was an implied 
promise, when that theory was never asserted to the jury in the 
court below, the Respondent would be denied due process of law. 
The only way to cure such a denial of due process would be to 
order a retrial and to submit to the jury new Interrogatories 
asking them to decide facts relevant to establishing or rebutting 
an implied promise, such as remoteness of the location, the 
familiarity of the parties with the remote location, and the 
reasonableness of the implication sought. Such findings cannot 
be made without consideration of evidence, which was excluded 
from Trial on Appellant's Motion, concerning shipping provisions. 
Finally, granting this Motion would complete the 
process of changing this from Trial by jury to Trial by ordeal. 
Appellant has had a Trial, a rehearing, and an appeal. The 
contract being litigated was specifically formulated so that 
Triax paid all costs of performance directly to the employees or 
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vendors. Triax's payments to Co-Ax were the profit on the work 
performed by Co-Ax, made as the work was performed. The present 
lawsuit is merely Co-Ax's attempt to obtain profit payments on 
work that they elected not to perform. (Trial Transcript p. 596, 
line 11 through p. 607, line 16) It is difficult to see any 
justice or equity in giving Appellant "another bite at the 
apple." Since Appellant has not even complied with the minimum 
requirements stated in Rule 35 for considereition of such a 
request, granting the request would be manifestly ^ unjust. 
DATED this r~^ day qfJDec^mber^^S? 
D^ ffver C. Snu&fei 
^MADDOX, NEI^ SON & ^ NUEFER 
Attorneys tor Appellee 
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